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Abstract— Over the last decade, Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs) have brought radical changes to the means and forms of 
communication for monitoring and control of a large number of 
applications including Smart Grid (SG). Traditional energy 
networks have been modernized to Smart Grids to boost the 
energy industry in the context of efficient and effective power 
management, performance, real-time control and information 
flow using two-way communication between utility provides and 
end-users. However, integrating two-way communication in 
smart grid comes at the cost of cyber security vulnerabilities and 
challenges. In the context of SG, node capture is a severe security 
threat due to the fact that a compromised node can significantly 
impact the operations and security of the SG network. In this 
paper, node compromise attack is explored on Advance Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) with smart meters for Neighbor Area 
Networks (NANs) in star and mesh network topologies. 
Simulation of node compromise/failure for a SG network, using 
ZigBee nodes in simulation indicates that a partial mesh topology 
is more resilient to node capture attacks as compared to star 
topology. A larger number of nodes are reachable from the 
control center of the SG in a partial mesh topology compared to 
that in a star topology.  
Keywords- Smart meter; Smart Grid;, Node Capture, Mesh 
Smart Meter, Start Smart Meter 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The swift development of information and communication 
technology (ICT) has not only changed the way we live our 
lives but also changed the industrial automation system 
including Smart Grid (SG) to an effective, efficient and 
reliable system. The integration of ICT has been of great 
importance to transform the traditional energy networks into 
SGs to ensure a reliable system and to overcome the 
limitations and challenges experienced by traditional energy 
networks. The U.S department of energy has defined the smart 
grid as an “electricity delivery system (from point of 
generation to point of consumption) integrated with 
communication and information technologies for enhanced 
grid operations, customers’ services and environmental 
benefits [1].”  
Recently, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have shown 
great potential for various applications including in SGs. The 
SG applications can include a range of devices/systems such 
as smart meters (SMs), advance metering infrastructure 
(AMI), wide area measurement system (WAMS), substation 
automation system, common information models (CIF), and 
fault diagnosis to achieve seamless, efficient energy 
transmission and distribution, effective and reliable remote 
monitoring due to its easy deployment in remote locations, 
low cost, low date rates and low energy consumption [2-5]. 
Regardless of the economical and functional benefits exploited 
by SGs, its adoption, deployment and resiliency has been of 
great challenge due to potential lack of adequate security and 
vulnerable attacks like node capture to damage confidentiality, 
integrity and availability [6-7]. SMs, deployed in domestic and 
commercial location, required to be interconnected for 
communication and data flow to management entities. The 
deployment (i.e. star, tree, partial/full mesh) will vary as per 
the distribution of SMs in NANs environment and can 
severely impact the network resiliency due to network threats. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the node compromise 
attack on AMI and so smart meters for NANs star and mesh 
network topology. SG network segments in different 
topologies are simulated using OPNET. The simulation results 
show that a partial mesh topology is more resilient to node 
capture (NC) attacks.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
related work followed by architecture and the functionality of 
SGs and its components in section 3. Section 4 describes the 
NC attack and its impact on NAN star and mesh topology is 
analyzed in section 5 and 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the 
paper and future work is outlined.  
II. SMART GRID OVERVIEW  
A SG network permits services to have bi-directional 
interaction with devices on their electric grid as well with end-
users and distributed power generation and storage facilities. 
To achieve the detailed view of the Smart Grid, it can be 
considered as a heterogeneous network (Fig. 1) based on the 
interconnection of multiple networks segments such as, the 
Home Area Networks (HANs) for effective energy at 
consumer end; the Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) for 
providing advance metering infrastructure; and the Wide Area 
Network (WAN) to distribute automation and the SG 
backbone [14]. The HAN interconnects to the WAN via a SM, 
which is part of NAN. Majority of the devices in the HAN and 
NAN are wireless communicating nodes. The 
interconnectivity of SMs into NAN is collectively referred to 
as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and is the main 
focus of this paper. NAN can be a network of smart meters 
creating a star, tree, or mesh network, which consists of smart 
meters and gateways that relay data. 
AMI facilitates the critical communication and control 
functions required to implement important energy 
management services such as pricing schemes, demand 
response, automatic meter reading, and management of power 
quality. AMI, integrated with million number of low-cost 
nodes being placed in insecure, uninterested and 
unsophisticated locations, make smart metering vulnerable to 
cyber-attacks such as spoofing, eavesdropping, Denial-of-
Service (DoS), man-in-the-middle attacks and node 
compromise [13,15]. To ensure secure communication and 
resiliency in SM infrastructure and so AMI is one of the 
critical requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
According to The U.S. Department of Energy, an emerging 
SG system must possess seven critical properties including 
resiliency to vulnerable attacks [8]. Over the last decade, 
malicious security threats on SG system have raised serious 
concerns. In 2003, due to Slammer worm attack from dial-up 
connection, Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Ohio was turned off 
to limit the impact of the threat [9]. In Iran, due the Bushehr 
power plant was infected due to one of the very first malicious 
coding attack known as Stuxnet worm [10]. The recent cyber-
attack on Ukraine’s power network also highlighted the 
security and system resiliency as major requirement for smart 
grid [11]. 
In [12], a binary tree based topology has been considered to 
introduce an efficient and scalable key management scheme 
for secure unicast, multicast and broadcast communication in 
SGs. The scheme demands considerable manual tasks to create 
the binary tree and transmit it together with secret key to each 
node. Due to binary tree nature, this scheme is vulnerable to 
NC attack where a compromised node can put network 
resiliency at risk due to unavailability of an alternative route. 
In [13] tree attack has been explored on tree topology and 
highlighted the tree topology as vulnerable for energy theft in 
AMI. There have been various studies to highlight and 
enhance the security of Smart Grids based on encryption 
techniques and key management approaches against different 
attacks. However, the analysis of NANs resiliency considering 
tree and mesh topology against attacks like NC has been 
overlooked. 
IV. NODE COMPROMISE / CAPTURE ATTACK  
Among various attacks in SGs, node compromise attack is 
a severe threat due to unattended nature of the sensor nodes. In 
a NC threat, an intruder can capture/compromise a node (SM) 
to get the access to secure cryptographic keys, node 
identification, communication between node and the network 
and monitor by re-deploying the compromised node into the 
network [16-17]. Once a node is compromised, it allows an 
intruder to execute various operations/attacks on the network 
and easily compromise the entire network. According to [18], 
there are three critical factors as mentioned below, which can 
lead intruder to compromise the entire network while 
triggering the node capture threat.  
1. Cryptography technology has been of great interest to 
secure data transmitted across the AMI and authenticates 
the different entities involved in the communication flow. 
Node capture threat can result into a massive threat if the 
key(s) used to encrypt/decrypt data among neighboring 
nodes are deployed with weak key security and 
management.  
2. The node deployment/topology play a critical role as it 
affects the scope of the node capture attacks. Generally, 
the scope can be defined based on the number of 
communication links such as, fewer the communication 
links between neighboring nodes (i.e. tree topology), the 
greater the possibility that an intruder can threat entire 
network. At the other end, higher the communication 
links between neighboring nodes (i.e. full/partial mesh 
topology), the smaller the possibility that an intruder can 
threat entire network. Therefore, node capture attacks 
seem to be less effective to mesh topology as compared to 
star topology, where there is only route from a child node 
to parent node.  
3. The node density also plays a critical role as it affects the 
scope of the node capture attacks. A node compromised in 
the larger density network can threat the larger section of 
network.  
Therefore, security of SM nodes and so the AMI is a 
critical issue to maintain the security and resiliency. 
Cryptography mechanisms based on symmetric (single share 
key) and asymmetric (public and private key) represents a 
Figure 1 Smart Grid Network 
crucial technology to secure the data transmitted across the 
nodes. A key (responsible to encrypt and decrypt data) plays a 
critical role and therefore an unauthorized access to key 
through a compromised node can threat entire network. In this 
paper, it is assumed the NANs use encrypted communication 
based on random redistribution key approach. 
SMs, deployed in domestic and commercial location, 
required to be interconnected for communication and data 
flow to management entities. The deployment (i.e. star, tree, 
partial/full mesh) will vary as per the distribution of SMs in 
NANs environment. Fig. 2, 3 shows the example of star and 
mesh NAN topology.  
Star-based network deployment is characterized by central 
root node, connected at the highest level in the hierarchy as 
show in Fig.3. Top-level node is connected to 2
nd
 level, 
whereas 2
nd
 level nodes are connected to 3
rd
 level and so forth. 
The levels of the star topology can be denoted by 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶=
{1, 2, … 𝑁}, where the 0𝑡ℎlevel is for top root.  
In a mesh network deployment, a node in each of the smart 
meter in NANs will communicate (transmit / receive) data by 
hoping from one node to another node until either the 
receiving node is reached or transmitted data reached to mesh 
gateway from node to node as shown in Fig. 3. The data from 
the gateway is typically transmitted to central data station via 
a backhaul network. The GWs are connected as start topology 
to backhaul network and SMs are connected as partial mesh as 
each SM is not directly connected to each of the other SM in 
the network.  
V. METHODOLOGY  
A. Network Security Model 
It is considered that a group of Smart Meters (SMs) with 
one SM taking on the role of a gateway (GW) is 
interconnected in a manner that some SMs have a multi hop 
path to the gateway (GW). The GW interconnects to the 
central authentication point over the backhaul network. SMs 
that are children of other SMs use the multi-hop path to reach 
the GW node as shown in Fig. 2. It is assumed the NANs use 
encrypted communication based on random redistribution key 
approach. Each node is configured with a set of (𝐾) different 
keys from a key pool of (𝑃) keys. A pair of nodes with the 
range (𝑅) can initiate a secure connectivity only if appropriate 
assigned keys are shared between them. It is also assumed that 
every node is deployed in a promiscuous approach and is able 
to recognize sources of all messages initiating from its 
neighboring nodes. Based on this assumption, each node will 
inspect only the source node ID therefore this assumption will 
not incur significant communication overhead.  
B. Network Threat Model and Performance Metrics 
It is assumed that an intruder can physically capture a 
limited number of SM nodes in a target region Ŗ and turn 
them into threat node by extracting secure keys and measured 
data for NAN. Considering Ç represents a set of nodes 
captured by intruder and for each node in set Ç, a set of secure 
keys are considered to be compromised. When a node is 
compromised, its connectivity to other nodes is affected. If the 
node is not an end node, a larger number of nodes lose 
connectivity. It allows intruder to clone a captured node and 
collaboratively deploy them in the NAN. The resiliency of 
NAN star and mesh topology in Smart Grid against NC attack 
will be evaluated based on following metrics; hop count, 
availability of SM, End to End Delay, and Energy 
Consumption. 
C. Network Topology and Simulation Setup 
To carry out evaluation of NC attacks, two NAN 
topologies, star and mesh as shown in Fig. 2 are considered. 
The NAN made of (𝑁) nodes is deployed over a region of 
(𝐴 ⊆ ℝ). Considering that SMs in the AMI are fixed nodes, 
there is no mobility aspect included. Each node is assumed to 
be equipped with an omni-directional radio with fixed 
communication range (𝑅) based on the Zigbee standard. To 
evaluate the resiliency of star and partial mesh topology in 
NAN in smart grid based on Zigbee network against node 
capture attack, OPNET simulation tool has been used. In both 
star and mesh topology simulation of NAN, network consist of 
a Zigbee coordinator (Gateway) and Zigbee end devices 
(SMs). 
 Case 1 – Star Topology: In this case, Zigbee nodes are 
deployed in a star topology for NAN.  
 Case 2 – Tree Topology: In a NAN tree topology, there is 
a relationship of root (GW) and child (SM) node. The 
child node can communicate only with their parent node 
whereas the parents can communicate with their child and 
their own parent node. Therefore, child node (SM) always 
depends on the parent node for data availability as there 
are no alternative routes for SM node to get target.  
 Case 3 – Mesh Topology: In this case, Zigbee nodes are 
deployed as partial mesh topology for NAN. NAN Mesh 
topology is more flexible as it can allow each node to 
choose between multiple routes to transmit/receive data to 
the target location. It also allows the network to self-heal 
and search for other paths and so that data can be relay 
through.  
 
Figure 2 Mesh Topology scenarios 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, the OPNET simulation [19] of both star and 
mesh NAN topologies against node capture attacks are 
discussed to highlight which NAN topology is more resilient 
against node capture attacks.  
A. Node Capture Attack and Impact on Reachability 
Node capture attack involves capturing a node and 
incapacitating it. Often the data in the node is retrieved for 
malicious use, but in case of tamper-resistant hardware, the 
access to data on the ROM of the device is avoided. Therefore, 
the primary impact of a node capture is the loss of the node. In 
addition to the loss of the sensed data from the node, the 
reachability from/to the central reporting node, the NOC, is 
impacted. This happens when the captured node provides a 
path for the downstream nodes to reach the NOC.  
In order to assess the impact of the reachability in the event 
of a node capture, star and mesh topologies are used to create 
a large network. For each node captured or a group of nodes 
captured, the number of nodes that are unreachable are noted. 
A network comprising ten ZigBee coordinator nodes, thirty 
ZigBee router nodes and a hundred ZigBee devices are used to 
create the network to test the impact of the node capture 
attack. The topology at the coordinator node is set to mesh and 
star respectively for each simulation run, in its network 
parameters. The coordinator node sends packets to the routers 
and end devices in each case.   
Nodes are randomly chosen to fail and the reachability 
from the NOC to all nodes is checked. The simulations are run 
for the two topologies separately and in each case, up to 9 
nodes are failed. The corresponding numbers of nodes that are 
unreachable are noted. The figure plots the number of 
unreachable nodes against the number of captured nodes.  
The plotted results indicate that the mesh topology of the 
ZigBee network fares better than the star topology. The results 
are dependent upon which nodes are captured in the mesh 
topology. If an attacker succeeds in capturing and 
incapacitating all the ZigBee router nodes, then the impact 
could be more intense. It could turn out that the mesh topology 
could fare worse than the star topology. 
 
 
Figure 4 Reachability of nodes after node captures 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Node capture attacks in Smart Grid can significantly 
degrade network performance and threaten network security. 
Based on the simulation results, it is identified that partial 
mesh topology is more resilient topology as compared to star 
topology in NAN in Smart Grid against node capture attacks. 
As compared to NAN star, NAN mesh topology is more 
flexible as it can allow smart nodes to choose between 
multiple routes to transmit/receive data to the target location, 
if one of the node(s) compromised. Due to the flexibility 
offered by mesh topology, it is not only resilient but also an 
ideal solution with easy to deploy in NAN environment.  
This study has been focused on simple star and partial mesh 
topology for NAN along with NC attack. For future work, the 
study will be extended to complex topology star, star and 
mesh topology along with advance threat model and security 
scheme to detect and avoid node capture attacks to enhance 
the network resiliency as well as security. 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Sioshansi, F. O, Smart Grid: Integrating Renewable, 
Distributed & Efficient Energy, Academic Press, 2012, p. 
89. 
2. V. C. Gungor, B. Lu and G. P. Hancke, "Opportunities and 
Challenges of Wireless Sensor Networks in Smart Grid," 
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 57, no. 
10, pp. 3557-3564, 2010. 
3. E. Fadel, V.C. Gungor, L. Nassef, N. Akkari, M.G. Abbas 
Malik, S. Almasri, I. F. Akyildiz, "A survey on wireless 
sensor networks for smart grid", Computer 
Communications, Vol. 1, pp. 22-33, 2015. 
4. Z. Popovic and V. Cackovic, "Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure in the context of Smart Grids," IEEE 
International Energy Conference (ENERGYCON), pp. 
1509-1514, 2014. 
5. L. Nian, C. Jinshan, Z. Lin, Z. Jianhua, and H. Yanling, "A 
Key Management Scheme for Secure Communications of 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure in Smart Grid," IEEE 
Figure 3 Star Topology scenarios 
Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 60, pp. 4746-
4756, 2013. 
6. M. Amin, “Guaranteeing the security of an increasingly 
stressed grid,” IEEE Smart Grid Newsletter, Feb. 2011. 
7. NIST, “Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, Volume 
1 - Smart Grid Cybersecurity Strategy, Architecture, and 
High-Level Requirements, The Smart Grid Interoperability 
Panel – Smart Grid Cybersecurity Committee, 2014, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. 
Department of Commerce. 
8. U.S. Department of Energy, National Energy Technology 
Laboratory, A Systems View of the Modern Grid, 2007.  
9. Y, Yang, T, Littler, S. Sezer, K. McLaughlin, H. F. Wang, 
“Impact of cyber-security issues on Smart Grid”, 2nd IEEE 
PES International Conference and Exhibition 
on Innovative Smart Grid Technologies, vol., no, pp.1,7, 
2011.  
10. D. Kushner. (2016, 8/3/2016). The Real Story of Stuxnet, 
2013, Available: 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-
stuxnet 
11. L. Tomkiw. (2016, 8/3/2016). Russia-Ukraine Cyberattack 
Update: Security Company Links Moscow Hacker Group 
To Electricity Shut Down. Available: 
http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-ukraine-cyberattack-
update-security-company-links-moscow-hacker-group-
2256634 
12. J. Y. Kim, and H. K. Choi, "An efficient and versatile key 
management protocol for secure smart grid 
communications," IEEE Wireless Communications and 
Networking Conference (WCNC), pp. 1823-1828, 2012. 
13. S. McLaughlin, D. Podkuiko, P. McDaniel, “Energy Theft 
in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure”, Critical 
Information Infrastructures Security, Vol. 6027 of the 
series Lec Notes in Computer Science, pp 176-187, 2009. 
14. W. Meng, R. Ma, and H.-H. Chen, "Smart grid 
neighbourhood area networks: a survey," IEEE Network, 
vol. 28, pp. 24-32, 2014 
15. S.H. Seo, X. Ding and E. Bertino, "Encryption key 
management for secure communication in smart advanced 
metering infrastructures," IEEE International Conference 
on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 
Vancouver, BC, pp. 498-503, 2013 
16. M. V. Bharathi, R. C. Tanguturi, C. Jayakumar and K. 
Selvamani, "Node capture attack in Wireless Sensor 
Network: A survey," IEEE International Conference on 
Computational Intelligence & Computing Research 
(ICCIC), Coimbatore, pp. 1-3, 2012. 
17. K.Venkatraman, J.Vijay Daniel, G.Murugaboopathi, 
"Various Attacks in Wireless Sensor Network: Survey", 
International Journal of Soft Computing and Engineering 
(IJSCE), Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 208-212, 2013. 
18. K. Kifayat, M. Merabti, Q, Shi, and D. Llewellyn-Jones, 
Security in Wireless Sensor Networks, Chapter 26, 
Handbook of Information and Communication Security, 
Springer Science & Business Media, 2010. 
19. RIVERBED. 2014. Riverbed Modeler Version 17.5, PL6,, 
Riverbed Software [Online]. Available: 
http://www.riverbed.com/. 
 
 
 
 
